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Abstract: Even the best governance and public administration systems can fail
because of lack of accountability. This paper reviews the factors likely to affect
the accountability of the collaborative governance system and suggests concrete
measures to ensure accountability. As an empirical case of collaborative gover-
nance, 300 Korean community centers were sampled by region and by size.
Exploratory Factor Analysis was conducted to identify the determinant factors
for the accountability of collaborative governance. This analysis found the fol-
lowing factors to be the most important in ensuring accountability in a collabo-
rative governance system: clarity of laws and regulations, representativeness of
participants, transparency and democracy in the decision-making process, and
performance management and incentive systems. The analysis also found that it
is necessary to conceive different performance management and incentive sys-
tems for public and civil groups.
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EMERGENCE OF COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The decision-making process of the Korean government has moved, over the past
two decades, toward more inclusive and participatory processes involving multiple
stakeholders. In the past, during the authoritarian political regime, most decisions were
made by a few government departments and a small number of policy makers.
Recently, however, issue-oriented decision-making networks have been emerging,
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conforming to the New Public Management governance paradigm, which emphasizes
participation and collaboration as core values and proposes a variety of management
skills to promote efficiency, effectiveness, and democracy in public administration
(Rhodes 1997; Pierre and Peters 2000; Jessop 2001).
However, a governance system, which is often suggested as a cure-all for contem-
porary public administration, is subject to failure—similar to market failure in the
nineteenth century and government failure in the twentieth century (Dunsire 1996;
Jessop 1998, 2002; Kooiman 2003). Many studies have demonstrated a possibility of
governance failure and have provided diverse diagnoses, which can be categorized
into two types (Eun et al. 2009, 2-3).
The first is a failure to properly cope with conflicts that arise with expansion of
policy-decision units. Governance is an attempt to improve policy efficiency and
effectiveness by ensuring participation of various stakeholders in the process of policy
making. However, with expanding policy-decision units, unexpected tension can break
out, and without proper management, serious social disruption or unnecessary social
costs may be incurred (Pierre and Peters 2000; Bae 2005; Suh and Min 2005, 27). As
can be seen in large-scale national projects with far-reaching impacts, such as con-
structing a nuclear waste disposal site or a large tunnel, reclamation of tideland, or
transfer of a military base, policy making and implementation often confront seemingly
insurmountable difficulties because a collaborative relationship fails to form among
interested parties.
The second type of failure is that of weakened accountability caused by participa-
tion and power distribution among a variety of stakeholders. Under state-centered gov-
ernance, the attribution of responsibility was clear. But under private-public collabora-
tive governance, the question of who has how much responsibility and for whom or
what has become ambiguous as the scope of policy making expands (Schubeler 1996;
Tendler 1997; Taylor 2007). Civil servants tend to make up for the loss of their power
by shedding as much responsibility as possible, and new policy-making participants
evade responsibility while claiming rights, aggravating the problem of accountability.
Lack of accountability subsequently leads to delay in the work process, poor commu-
nication, and poor quality, and may further widen the chasms between participants.
In that context, this study examines factors likely to affect accountability of collab-
orative governance and to develop an accountability index for an assessment frame-
work. To this end, it examines community centers in Korea as an empirical example of
collaborative governance. The community center approach was adopted in Korea in
1999, and as of March 2008, 2,621 centers were operating on the principle of public-
private collaboration, which engages public agencies, local residents, and nongovern-
mental and nonprofit organizations to form networks to address local issues. It
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accounts for 73.9 percent of a total of 3,547 local offices in the country.
This study reviews different definitions of accountability and accountability indexes
provided in the literature and explores their relevance to collaborative governance.
The premise of the study is that existing accountability indexes based on studies of
bureaucratic systems do not adequately reflect the structure and characteristics of col-
laborative governance, and that it is necessary to develop a new index to measure the
accountability of collaborative governance. To this end, the study surveyed 300 com-
munity centers across Korea and analyzed the responses based on the centers’ location
and size.
This paper reviews existing theory on the subject, constructs an operational index
that can assess the accountability of community centers in Korea, and introduces a
research methodology. It then presents the survey results and analyzes them, using
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) for 23 measurement items to determine how they
can be grouped. Factors to consider in designing an accountability index for collabora-
tive governance are presented, followed by suggestions on how accountability of col-
laborative governance can be ensured by using the identified index.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Researchers have provided widely varying definitions of accountability without
reaching a consensus on its scope or format. Its definition becomes ever more confus-
ing as more research is conducted. An equally strenuous effort is being made to sim-
plify the concept of accountability (Jos and Tompkins 2004; Bovens 2007; Erkkila
2007). This suggests that content and type of accountability may vary according to
context (Peters 1989, 252-53; Sinclair 1995; Romzek and Dubnick 2000, 34-35) and
indicates that accountability is not a fixed or universally applicable concept. Similarly,
methods to improve accountability may vary according to circumstances (Day and
Klein 1987; Erkkila 2007, 7).
Concept of Accountability
Accountability originates from the word accounting, and the concept has been in
use since the ancient Greek era (Lee and Yang 2007, 80-81). Initially, the idea was to
conduct bookkeeping or auditing to provide information to people outside an enter-
prise. The concept evolved over time, and today, simply put, accountability of public
administration is connected to answerability. Definitions of accountability include the
following:
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• Edwards and Hulme (1996) argued that accountability indicates that individuals
and organizations should report all activities for which they are responsible to a
higher authority.
• Choung (1996) and Romzeck and Dubnick (2000) defined accountability as an
act of explaining, reporting, and elucidating actions and conforming to external
judgment.
• Kim, No, and Lee (2004) said that accountability indicates that one party
explains and responds to other interested parties about its discretion regarding
rights and obligations, accommodates criticism and requirements, takes actions
accordingly, and bears responsibility for failure, inability, and neglect.
It is common to understand accountability in relation to answerability, but different
researchers emphasize different points, and their studies contain a wide variety of fine
points.
• Harmon (1981) argued that accountability can be made official through law,
regulation, court order, or other authoritative mandate, and that accountability
occurs when control over a civil servant’s action comes from outside a particu-
lar organization or from other individuals. He emphasized answerability and
control in the concept of accountability, as well as the official nature of
accountability.
• Sharkansky (1982) argued that accountability is an administrative form of obe-
dience to orders and instructions from higher authority as specified in a proper
format. He connected the concept of answerability with subordination.
• Shah (2006) defined accountability as observance of regulations, stressing the
legal and systematic character of the concept.
• Mosher (1982) argued that accountability is justification of individuals’ acts
based on objective obligations based on laws and regulations.
• Choe (2003) said that accountability indicates who is responsible to provide
feedback to a particular action or character in a public organization, putting
emphasis on the subject (holder) of accountability.
• Lee and Yang (2007) defined accountability as an obligation to provide
responsible explanation and to explain how resources are efficiently and effec-
tively used and with what significant outcomes and social contributions. They
emphasized the aspect of performance in accountability.
Kim, Lee, and Lee (2005, 544) provided a definition of accountability on two lev-
els. In a narrow sense, accountability is a legal obligation to carry out stipulated tasks.
Then, there is a wider definition of accountability that goes beyond the matter of
answerability. Although these researchers did not provide further explanation, the
most common component is responsibility.
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Accountability and responsibility are occasionally used interchangeably, but strict-
ly speaking, they are different concepts. As researchers provide different definitions
for the two concepts, it is hard to accurately define their relationship. Some scholars
argue that accountability and responsibility are separate concepts; others argue that
they are synonymous; still others see responsibility as a part of accountability, or
accountability as a part of responsibility. The most widely accepted definitions are
summarized below:
• Accountability and responsibility as separate concepts: Kernaghan (1978) dis-
tinguished between objective responsibility (accountability) and subjective
responsibility (responsibility). Choung (1996, 268) argued that responsibility
involves wide-ranging moral values and self-regulated obligations and is dif-
ferent from accountability, which involves legal and forced obligations. Shah
(2006) regarded accountability as observance of legal and systematic regula-
tions and responsibility as the principle of earning people’s trust by improving
the quantity, quality, and efficiency of public service.
• Accountability and responsibility as the same: Cooper (1982) argued that both
objective and subjective responsibility fall under the category of responsibility.
Kim, No, and Lee (2004) defined responsibility as the act of providing expla-
nation and response to interested parties about their discretion on right and
obligation, conforming to critique and requirements and taking actions accord-
ingly and bearing responsibility for failure, inability, and neglect.
• Responsibility as part of accountability: Mulgan (2001) argued that responsi-
bility contains many internal, personal, moral, and ethical values, while
accountability has a far larger scope, as it includes official systematic responsi-
bility. Moreover, accountability interacts with responsiveness, unlike responsi-
bility, and thus is a far more complex concept.
• Accountability as part of responsibility: Bark (2001) defined responsibility as
combining accountability and responsiveness. Similarly, Lee K. (2005) regard-
ed accountability as an objective obligation and responsibility as a subjective
obligation that is further reaching than the objective obligation.
Accountability Index
Definitions of accountability thus range from simple answerability to more com-
plex concepts that include aspects of control, performance, responsibility, and respon-
siveness. Accountability is not merely about obligation in accounting for a report, but
involves a process of explaining and reporting on overall business activities and man-
agement (Choung 1996, 272). Here, report and explanation include grounds and justi-
fication for one’s tasks of the past, present, and future and acknowledgement of penal-
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ties for mistakes instead of mere provision of information (Schedler 1999, 17). In
other words, accountability contains elements of information, justification, and pun-
ishment (Lee and Yang 2007, 81).
From the perspective of a subject (actor), accountability indicates taking on respon-
sibility for another (Mulgan 2001; Kim, No, and Lee, 2004, 269) through an official
procedure. In this sense, the concept of accountability includes direction (for whom to
be responsible), object (for what to be responsible), and nature (how to be responsi-
ble). This is described further in table 1.
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Table 1. Accountability Index
Classification Index Content
Direction of Upward • The activity records of the organization are periodically prepared and 
accountability accountability submitted to higher organizations.
• Procedures and systems to reflect higher organizations’ evaluations 
and recommendations have been established.
Downward • Systematic devices to grasp the preferences and needs of customers 
accountability (service consumers) have been designed.
• Procedures to collect and reflect the complaints raised by customers 
(service consumers) have been prepared.
Horizontal • Work-related information and know-how are shared with individuals 
accountability or organizations conducting similar work.
Inward • Efforts are made to share the vision, mission, and value of the 
accountability organization among the members.
• Uncontradictory designs of the vision, mission, value, work 
implementation procedures, and evaluation procedures are available.
Subject of Process • The organization’s internal decision-making processes are democratic.
accountability accountability • Established institutional devices and procedures exist to allow 
customers (service consumers) external to the organization to 
participate in the decision-making processes of the organization.
• The organization’s work implementation processes are disclosed at all 
times.
Performance • Institutional devices exist to measure and evaluate the quality of 
accountability projects and programs.
• Efforts are made to enhance the quality of projects and programs, and 
compensation systems exist to reward organization members who 
produce concrete outcomes.
• Customer groups’ satisfaction with projects and programs is measured.
Moral/ethical • A charter of ethics has been established.
accountability • A code of conduct has been established.
Accountability inevitably involves a certain direction, as it indicates one’s obliga-
tion for a report to (and subsequent control by) another (Simey 1985). Edwards and
Hulme’s (1996) study on accountability of civic organizations provided four directions
of accountability: upward, downward, horizontal, and inward. Upward accountability
includes obligation to a higher authority on a hierarchical order. Downward account-
ability indicates obligation to serve recipients or represented groups. Horizontal
accountability means obligation to peer groups, and inward accountability is con-
cerned with organizational structure and management conditions, and accountability
for the mission and value of an organization and its members.
The object of accountability can be divided into the moral and ethical values of
organizational members (responsibility), work process (answerability), and perfor-
mance (responsiveness). Whether individual or group, responsibility always includes
the question “for what.” Accountability inevitably involves specific content and an
object of control. This corresponds to previously examined concepts of answerability,
responsibility and responsiveness. What corresponds to answerability is control over
the work process. According to Schedler (1999, 17), accountability is an act of provid-
ing information on one’s tasks of the past, present, and future with responsibility for
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Classification Index Content
Nature of Organizational • Job descriptions for individual classes and duties in the organization 
accountability accountability have been prepared.
• Criteria for selecting suitable personnel for given position classes and 
duties have been prepared.
• Personnel management criteria are fair and transparent.
• Periodic internal/external audits are scheduled, including financial 
audits relating to the works of the organization.
• Persons in charge of internal/external audits are experts
• Audit results are disclosed appropriately.
Legal • Objectives, tasks, work procedures, and expected results and effects 
accountability of works are stipulated explicitly.
• Methods for administration of punishment when the operation of the 
organization has violated regulations are stipulated.
Political • The organization’s activity records are periodically prepared and 
accountability submitted to customer groups or their representatives.
• Procedures and methods are stipulated to impose liability when any 
activity record of individuals or the organization is unsatisfactory or 
involves errors.
Moral • A charter of ethics has been established.
accountability • A code of conduct has been established. 
another person or organization, and this is premised on transparency of the work
process through continued conversation and communication with the controlling
authority and interested parties. What corresponds to responsiveness is performance,
which has come to the forefront of the administration field along with governance and
New Public Management.
Whether upward, downward, inward, or outward, having accountability means
being responsible for process, customer satisfaction, and a specific outcome. There-
fore, the concept of responsiveness that attentively detects and satisfies customer
needs is naturally connected to performance and its control.
The concept of responsibility also contains moral and ethical values, which Lee K.
(2005) termed subjective obligation. It indicates how much effort organizational mem-
bers make to carry out their tasks and how honestly and accurately they endeavor to
do their work.
Accountability can also be categorized as either organizational, legal, political, or
moral (Gilbert 1969, 382-83 and Lee K. 2005, 42-46). Taking responsibility for anoth-
er actor or group means that a specific rule and procedure exists to call a person to
account. These pieces of research present the internal hierarchical order of an organi-
zation as the first element of a specific system of responsibility, which is present in
conventional bureaucracy. Legal enforcement consists of elements such as office regu-
lations, work process regulations, and rewards and penalties. Political control is exert-
ed through a traditional decision-making structure of external higher authority or other
peripherally acting groups. Moral control could be exerted, for example, by a compre-
hensive and voluntary code of ethics or behavior.
ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHOD
As research results accumulate, the concept of accountability continues to expand,
evolving from answerability to include aspects of control, performance, responsibility,
and responsiveness. As a result, the index of accountability has also diversified. Mod-
ern administration should have ethically and morally sound internal perceptions and
motives (Lee K. 2005, 34-36) to faithfully carry out its obligation according to rules
(this was usually referred to as “subjective obligation (responsibility)” in previous
studies) that set out the responsibility for work outcome (performance) in terms of cus-
tomer satisfaction and should conform to numerous control mechanisms.
However, these definitions and indexes are centered on a perspective of conven-
tional management of bureaucracy rather than governance. The above discussions are
based on the premise that the subject of all accountability is a single actor or group or
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organization, without referring to accountability among multiple actors or groups or
organizations. Thus, the index might not be relevant in measuring and evaluating
accountability in collaborative governance. The following section provides a glimpse
of the concept and main characteristics of collaborative governance and examines why
the conventional index of accountability might not be applicable to it. In addition, the
research process and methodology are briefly described to develop an accountability
index for collaborative governance.
Collaborative Governance
Governance is different from conventional bureaucracy in that it is a new ruling
process that responds to changing circumstance (Rhodes 1997) and an interactive sys-
tem that involves various stakeholders’ participation, negotiation, conflict and collabo-
ration (Kooiman 2003). Collaborative governance is characterized by participation of
multiple actors, and it especially emphasizes mutual collaboration among different
participants sharing common goals and tasks. Some key recent definitions are summa-
rized below.
• Huxham (2000) defined collaborative governance as including participants
from multiple organizations with shared tasks.
• Kim et al. (2002) defined collaborative governance on two levels. In a narrow
sense, it is a type of system and adjustment that facilitates various participants
to collaborate through voluntary and mutually beneficial principle of interde-
pendence even without official authority. In a wider sense, it is a mutually col-
laborative new adjustment method that emerged with collapse of division
between government-led public agencies and private agencies.
• Kooiman (2003) argued that no one actor can provide a fair and effective ruling
in a diverse, dynamic, and complex social realm, and governability depends on
the quality of interaction among various participants. Voluntary participation
and collaboration are crucial elements in smooth interaction. Taking this a step
further from interactive governance, Kooiman defined “socio-political gover-
nance” as “sharing a series of responsibility among nation, market and civic
society,” emphasizing responsibility and the collaborative aspect of governance.
• Hong (2004) borrowed an argument of Streeck and Schmitter (1985) on the
idea of community, market, and association as a principle for forming social
order and distinguished between three types of governance: collaborative, hier-
archical, and competitive. Collaborative governance indicates a problem-solv-
ing approach based on voluntary collaboration among central and local govern-
ments, nongovernmental organizations, and community residents, suggesting a
highly interdependent collaboration for policy making.
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• Henton et al. (2008, 3-4) interpreted collaborative governance as combining
the meanings of collaboration and governance. While governance indicates a
process of adjustment that affects the decisions and behavior of the market,
government, and civic society, collaboration involves various elements of soci-
ety working toward a shared goal, based on the principle of reciprocity.
• According to Tang and Mazmanian (2008, 5), collaborative governance means
the process of establishing, steering, facilitating, operating, and monitoring
cross-sectoral organizational arrangements to address public policy problems
that cannot be easily addressed by a single organization or the public sector.
These arrangements are characterized by joint efforts, reciprocal expectations,
and voluntary participation among formally autonomous entities, from two or
more sectors—public, for-profit, and nonprofit—in order to leverage the unique
attributes and resources of each. They also suggest that the collaborative
process may span across one, several, or even all the stages of the public policy
process—from formulation, enactment, and implementation to evaluation and
feedback.
• Kim (2008, 51) borrowed Gray’s (1985, 1989) and Wondolleck and Yaffe’s
(2000) concepts of collaboration and defined collaborative governance as a
joint decision-making process that collects and distributes visible resources
(capital, labor) and invisible resources (understanding, information, authority)
and develops a shared vision in order to solve common issues.
• Park (2008, 123) argued that a single focused decision-making process in
administrative bureaucracy fails to ensure timely problem solving as the infor-
mation society has brought about rapid social changes, complexity, diversity,
and dynamism. Collaborative governance is a solution to bring a decision-
making body closer to a field in order to promptly respond to a problem and to
reduce the cost of switching to “decision-making mode for a particular prob-
lem.” Collaborative governance applies to an interactive relationship (either
collaboration or confrontation) between public administration and civic soci-
ety, instead of regarding them as unitary or dual entities.
Collaborative governance, based on voluntary participation and mutual collabora-
tion, is clearly different from conventional bureaucracy in terms of organizational
structure, work process, and responsibility (Kim 2008, 51). First of all, the structure of
collaborative governance is problem-solving-oriented and thus amorphous and atypi-
cal compared to conventional bureaucracy. Also, it depends on a horizontal relation-
ship rather than hierarchical order and is more outward-looking than internally direct-
ed. Instead of the closed self-interest of bureaucracy, collaborative governance pays
attention to the environment, human rights, freedom, and peace, and relies on knowl-
edge, information, problem-solving ability, and leadership for organizational manage-
ment rather than on official position or authority. In terms of responsibility, it aspires
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to procedural control through conversation and communication rather than post-evalu-
ation of conformity or observation, ultimately pursuing a performance-oriented
responsibility structure. Under collaborative governance, collaboration, shared vision,
and trust-based long-term relationships and community relationships prevail over
competition, conflict, or opportunistic attitudes (table 2).
Thus, collaborative governance is a system that pursues better performance
through mutual collaboration, sharing of rights, and joint decision making based on
voluntary participation of various actors. To ensure accountability of collaborative
governance, an interactive control mechanism is required rather than a one-way
approach. The control should be over interrelationships among various participants
and their groups instead of a particular actor or a group. Without control over relation-
ships among multiple interactive actors, control as well as the entire governance sys-
tem may not be highly efficient.
From a perspective of conventional control, it is hard to address the collaboration
and accountability that characterize governance. While conventional control is a
device to improve the answerability, responsibility, performance, and responsiveness
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Table 2. Features of Conventional Bureaucracy and Collaborative Governance
Category Conventional bureaucracy Collaborative governance
Organizational Structural criteria Geographical characteristics, Problem solving
structure functions, customers, 
and outputs
Organizational structure Vertical Horizontal
Management focus Internal control Management of external 
environment
Management method Fragmented approach Comprehensive and 
to problems sustainable development
Basic management Order, control, Ideas, information, problem-
principles and authority solving ability, commitment, 
passion, humane attitude, 
leadership
Work process Subject and object Separated Not separated
of responsibility
Goal-achieving approach Competition Collaboration
Responsibility Rule-oriented Performance-oriented
mechanism
Source: Adapted from Kim, No, and Lee 2004.
of a particular actor or group or organization, in collaborative governance, a control
method needs to be developed to improve collaborative relationships among multiple
participants and their groups or organizations to ensure accountability. For collabora-
tive governance, therefore, accountability for an internal collaborative relationship is
even more important than accountability for the outside world. The central argument
of this study is that the accountability index for collaborative governance should shift
its focus to accountability for collaboration instead of emphasizing its direction,
object, and nature.
Governance Structure of Korean Community Centers
Since 1999, as part of its effort to create a smaller government, the Korean govern-
ment has worked on transforming the functions of district (eup/myeon/dong) offices,
which used to provide field services for local administration. Due to emerging needs
for efficient and effective service provision and delivery, such tasks as social welfare
and safety management were transferred to superior institutions at the municipal (gun
and gu) levels. The function of district (eup/myeon/dong) offices, renamed as resi-
dents’ centers, was then limited to provision of traditional services for civil affairs.
This change provided a foundation to establish self-governing institutions with the
participation of community residents and with extra space and staff: community cen-
ters.1 This study will review the organizational and operational states of community
centers while retracing the structure of collaborative governance—arguing, based on




Unlike in the West, Korean community centers were not organized spontaneously
from the bottom up, but from the top down as a part of a public administration reform
(Lee S.M. 2005). Nevertheless, the concept of community centers is similar to that of
community centers in Anglo-American societies and citizens’ centers in Japan (Yoo
2004, 7-9). Kim and Ryoo (2008, 86) also defined Korean community centers as self-
determinant organizations. This is because Korean community centers provide oppor-
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1. Legal language governing this issue can be found in Article 8 of the Municipal Self-Gov-
erning Law, the Enforcement Ordinance Article 8 of the same law, and the Standard for
Establishment and Operation of Community Centers.
tunities for residents to solve local problems by themselves, having the attributes of
administrative organizations to provide specific public services while also having
autonomous functions allowing residents to participate in managing collective affairs.
Thus the authors argue that Korean community centers are similar to those in Anglo-
American societies in that they function as a tribunal for discussion and interaction by
local residents.
Organizational Structure
Community centers can be differentiated from traditional bureaucratic systems above
all in their horizontal form of organization. The heads of district offices (residents’ cen-
ters) are expected to take charge of the operation of community centers as well, but in
that regard they are obliged to systematically consult the community council.
Community councils deliberate on matters regarding (1) the installation and opera-
tion of community centers; (2) the improvement of residents’ culture, welfare, and
benefits; (3) the strengthening of residents’ autonomous activities, (4) the formation of
regional communities, and (5) other matters necessary for the operation of community
centers. Thus, community councils are the practical operators of community centers.
Each community council is composed of at least 15, but not more than 30, mem-
bers and may not have more than three advisers. The chairperson and the vice chair-
person are elected by council members but cannot be civil servants (including local
assemblymen). Council membership is an unpaid honorary post, although actual
expenses may be compensated if the budget permits. The term of office is two years,
and council members may be reappointed.
This means that, while residents’ centers maintain the organizational structure of a
traditional bureaucracy system, community centers can be seen as having a representa-
tive governance structure, raising the necessity of collaboration between government
and citizens.
Management Focus
The ultimate objectives of community centers are to enhance the quality of life of
residents by operating cultural and social (welfare) facilities and programs for resi-
dents and to serve the role of a central body to enhance the autonomy of residents
through their direct participation. Therefore, unlike the residents’ centers in charge of
traditional public administrative functions for civil affairs (such as issuance of docu-
ments, social welfare, civil defense and disaster management, and provision of public
administrative information), community centers are required to conduct the functions
outlined in table 3.
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However, the most important function of community centers is the promotion of a
sense of community among residents by providing a stage for exchanges and meetings
and a social education function. These functions are intended to foster public spirit,
thereby overcoming the alienation, individualization, and anonymity of residents (Lee
2000). Unlike the bureaucracy system, which prioritizes internal control in organiza-
tions, community centers emphasize management of the external environment.
Management Method
Community centers are expected to pursue sustained development through long-
term and comprehensive problem solving rather than to respond to fragmentary and
immediate problems. These characteristics are revealed more clearly when categoriz-
ing various community center programs by type. In 31,752 programs implemented by
community centers across the country as of March 2008, the number of culture and
leisure programs was 16,829 (53.0 percent), constituting a major part of the program,
followed by 5,815 citizen education programs (18.4 percent). Educational programs
accounted for 71.4 percent of the community programs (internal data of The Ministry
of Public Administration Safety, 2008).
Basic Management Principles
Community centers have the motto of self-determination and voluntary operation
through participation of local residents led by community councils. Therefore, com-
munity centers that represent residents’ needs while forming direct contact points with
residents are characterized by accurate knowledge and information on pending prob-
lems, problem-solving ability, and leadership, rather than reliance on official positions
or authority. These characteristics can be easily identified from the testimonies of
many participants, indicating that dialogue in the course of operation is essential for
community centers to achieve their goals.2
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Table 3. Community Center Functions
Functions Examples of services
Residents’ autonomy Discussion of regional issues, improvement of community environment, 
disaster prevention
Culture and leisure Local cultural events, hobby classes, physical exercise activities, exhibitions
Citizen education Culture lectures, youth classes, community culture research groups
Assistance to residents Provision of everyday life information, flee markets, meeting rooms
Regional welfare Health improvement, youth study room, community library
Community development House front cleaning, mutual assistance, youth guidance 
Work Process
Subject and Object of Responsibility
The ordinance governing community center installation and operation involves
four categories of actors: heads of residents’ centers (eup/myeon/dong offices), civil
servants responsible for community centers, chairpersons of community councils and
its members. The heads of residents’ centers (eup/myeon/dong offices) are also
responsible for the operation of community centers and are obligated to report matters
to higher organizations. They also have the right to appoint members of community
councils and civil servants responsible for community centers. The chairpersons of
community councils represent the councils and have the right to hold meetings with
civil servants and council members.
This ordinance stipulates the legal accountability of these four categories of actors.
Thus, discussions of the accountability of community centers can be accomplished by
focusing on these four subjects. However, there is no clear definition of the subjects
and objects of responsibility in the operation of community centers. Although the
heads of eup/myeon/dong offices are purported to be responsible for community cen-
ters, community councils have no concrete tools or measures to call the heads of
eup/myeon/dong offices to account, and the heads of eup/myeon/dong offices also can-
not call community councils to account in any way.
Goal-Achieving Approach
The operation of community centers is thus based on the principle of collaboration
rather than competition. Importance is attached to mutual collaboration on common
visions rather than conflicts and long-term transaction relationships; relationships are
seen as communities and based on trust rather than on opportunistic calculations.
Indeed, the majority of the heads of community centers and the members of communi-
ty councils have testified that the relationships between the two parties are premised
on collaboration and trust rather than competition and conflict; they make efforts to
provide opportunities for personal contacts and dialogue in everyday life as well as
official meetings and procedures. In short, the concerned parties perceive and practice
dialogues and collaboration as practical tools to accomplish their common goals, as
there is no other internal control tool apt to enhance the responsibility of each party.
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2. These statements are based on interviews with four chairpersons of community councils
and three heads of residents’ centers.
Responsibility Mechanism
Since the subjects and the objects of responsibility are not separated, the operation
of community centers is based on a process of mutual control. The method of accom-
plishing objectives is also based on collaboration rather than on competition. This sys-
tem is clearly distinguished from the traditional control mechanism of bureaucratic
systems: community centers are based on the principle of dialogue and communica-
tion rather that ex post facto control according to compliance or noncompliance with
regulations. Consequently, the responsibility structure of community centers is perfor-
mance-oriented rather than regulation-oriented.
For the heads of community centers, who are professional civil servants, the out-
comes of their community center activities are evaluated and directly linked to incen-
tives such as promotions. But for the members of community councils, their member-
ship provides them with experience that can help them strive for electoral positions
such as gu assemblymen or members of the provincial or national assembly. There-
fore, it seems that concrete outcomes that satisfy the necessities and desires of resi-
dents through the mediation of collaborative relationships are becoming increasingly
common interests of the two groups, and responsibility for outcomes is perceived as
more important than responsibility for processes.
This observation also seems to be derived from the community centers’ outcome-
oriented responsibility structure, which differentiates between the subject and the object
of responsibility. This structure is based on collaborative relationships because collabo-
ration is a major method of accomplishing objectives; the concrete outcomes resulting
from collaboration can be used to measure and evaluate the degree of collaboration.
Research Method
In the previous sections, community centers have been shown to be a case of col-
laborative governance involving government representatives and citizens, since,
although they use the physical spaces and budgets provided by the government, deci-
sions are jointly made by residents and civil servants and decisions are jointly execut-
ed by civil servants, residents, and citizen groups. In an attempt to derive a measure to
ensure the accountability of collaborative governance, this study employed the follow-
ing procedures, using community centers as empirical cases in order to derive indexes
for the accountability of collaborative governance.
First, the 23 items in table 1, which were developed as an accountability index for
conventional bureaucracy, were converted into a survey to examine what the impor-
tant accountability factors are for field actors at community centers and to measure the
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importance of each (see table 4).3 The assumption was that the factors perceived as
most significant in explaining accountability of community centers can also be regard-
ed as the accountability index for collaborative governance. Even though these 23
items were developed from a conventional perspective of bureaucracy, they are a valid
index as they work as a mechanism for mutual control within collaborative gover-
nance arrangements. In other words, whether they refer to conventional bureaucracy
or collaborative governance, the concept and attributes (direction, object and nature)
of accountability remain identical, and so what matters is to elucidate which specific
factors are more decisive in the case of collaborative governance.
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3. Because index 11 in table 1 (moral accountability) overlapped with index 7 (moral/ethical
accountability), index 11 was omitted from table 5. The conversion of the general account-
ability indexes in table 1 into the accountability indexes for community centers in table 5
was based on in-depth interviews with the heads of eup/myeon/dong offices, members of
community councils participating in the operation of community centers, and residents,
while referring to earlier studies on community centers. The in-depth interviews were con-
ducted with the heads and members of community councils, first-line heads of dong
offices, responsible civil servants, and 12 residents, for a total of 14 hours and 30 minutes.
Table 4. Accountability Index for Community Centers
Category Index Description Survey item
Direction Upward Does the community center submit performance reports a01
accountability to a higher authority (municipal, gun, gu office)?
Does the community center reflect the opinions and a02
evaluations of a higher authority (municipal, gun, gu office)?
Downward Does the community center conduct a survey before or a03
accountability after a project in order to examine residents’ needs and 
preferences?
Does the community center make continued efforts to a04
examine residents’ complaints and redress problems?
Horizontal Does the community center have official or unofficial a05
accountability information sharing networks with other centers or 
councils?
Inward Does the community center have a well-organized annual a06
accountability plan?
Do members of the community council share the annual a07
plan with the community?
Second, an EFA of the 23 items, as shown in table 4, was conducted to eliminate
items with little significance and to facilitate the analysis. How these 23 items could
be regrouped was then examined. By interpreting their implications, an accountability
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Category Index Description Survey item
Object Process Is the decision-making process of the community center a08
accountability (council) fair and transparent?
Does the community center (council) regularly notify a09
community residents of its decisions?
Does the community center (council) consider residents’ a10
needs and preferences in the decision-making process?
Performance Does the community center (council) grant proper rewards a11
accountability to council members or volunteers for excellent performance?
Does the community center (council) receive proper rewards a12
from a higher authority (municipal, gun, or gu office) for 
excellent performance?
Accountability Does any community council member pursue personal a13
for moral and interests at work?
ethical values Is there a measure to prohibit people from participating in the a14
council in pursuit of personal interests?
Nature Organizational Do community council members actively participate in a15
accountability council activities?
Is there a measure to regulate council members who neglect a16
council activities?
Legal Are the obligations and tasks of each council member clearly a17
accountability described?
Does the community council regulate violations of tasks and a18
work processes by council members?
Political Does the community council endeavor to actively a19
accountability communicate with local residents and reflect their opinions?
In case residents have complaints about the work of the a20
community council, is there a way to appeal to a higher 
authority (municipal, gun, or gu office)?
Is there a specific standard for appointing members to the a21
community council?
Is the process of appointing council member fair and a22
transparent?
Is the expertise of community council members sufficiently a23
considered in making appointments? 
index was organized that should be taken into consideration in assessing performance
of collaborative governance. Previous studies on case examples and interviews with
the chief of the eup/myeon/dong office, community council members, and local resi-
dents were also taken into account.
ANALYSIS
Descriptive Statistics
The survey was conducted with two major groups involved with the community
centers: the chiefs of the eup/myeon/dong offices and their field officers in one group,
and the heads and members of the community councils in the other. A self-adminis-
tered questionnaire was used. Four copies of the survey (one for the chief of the
eup/myeon/dong office, one for the field officer, one for the head of the community
council, and one for a council member) were e-mailed to 300 community centers out
of 2,600 in the country, sampling different geographic locations (including Jeju Island)
and sizes (metropolitan city and province).
Out of 1,200 questionnaires distributed, 969 were returned, of which eight were
eliminated for incompleteness. In terms of jobs, 235 respondents (24.4 percent) were
chiefs of eup/myeon/dong, 210 (21.9 percent) were heads of community councils, 223
(23.2 percent) were members of a council, and 293 (30.5 percent) were public ser-
vants, which showed quite an even distribution (table 5).
Out of 23 items addressing accountability of the community center, respondents
gave a positive reply (average score over 3.0) to 14 items. Item a13 (which measured
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Table 5. Demographic Attributes of Survey Respondents
Category Frequency (%) Category Frequency (%)
Educational High school diploma 305 (31.7)
background Vocational college diploma 156 (16.3)
Four-year college diploma 464 (48.3)
Graduate school or higher 36 (3.7)
Position Chief of eup/myeon/dong office 235 (24.4)
Head of community council 210 (21.9)
Member of community council 223 (23.2)
Field officer 293 (30.5) 
Gender Male 718 (74.7)
Female 243 (25.3)




Over 60 105 (10.9)
accountability for moral and ethical values) showed a negative perception, with an
average score below 2.0; however, since the lower score indicates higher accountabili-
ty for moral and ethical values, the result actually suggests a positive perception that
can be converted to an average score over 3.0. For items a11 and a12 (which measured
accountability for performance), the average score was below 3.0; 46.7 percent and
41.5 percent respectively of the respondents gave a negative reply (table 6).
Exploratory Factor Analysis—Index for Collaborative Governance
Based on the survey results for the 23 items, this study conducted EFA in order to
identify factors that affected the accountability of the community centers. The method
of principal component analysis was adopted to contain the maximum information
with minimal numbers. For rotation of factors, varimax rotation was used because it
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Table 6. Average and Standard Deviation for Each Survey Item
Survey item Index Average (N=691) Standard deviation
a01 Upward accountability 1 3.41 .638
a02 Upward accountability 2 3.36 .575
a03 Downward accountability 1 2.89 .748
a04 Downward accountability 2 3.37 .597
a05 Horizontal accountability 3.00 .709
a06 Inward accountability 1 3.31 .638
a07 Inward accountability 2 3.21 .662
a08 Accountability for process 1 3.51 .554
a09 Accountability for process 2 3.00 .694
a10 Accountability for process 3 3.15 .596
a11 Accountability for performance 1 2.57 .798
a12 Accountability for performance 2 2.61 .785
a13 Accountability for moral and ethical values 1 1.46 .653
a14 Accountability for moral and ethical values 2 3.11 .841
a15 Organizational accountability 1 3.06 .657
a16 Organizational accountability 2 2.61 .719
a17 Legal accountability 1 2.84 .731
a18 Legal accountability 2 2.71 .761
a19 Political accountability 1 3.14 .660
a20 Political accountability 2 2.54 .741
a21 Legal accountability 3 3.12 .685
a22 Political accountability 3 3.35 .612
a23 Organizational accountability 3 2.87 .707
Note: The Likert 4-point scale was used (1 = not at all to 4 = very much so).
maintains mutual independence of factors.
Five factors were extracted with eigenvalues over 1.0, and 20 variables were final-
ized in consideration of the commonality and confidence coefficient of each item of
identified factors.
The KMO (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin) value, which shows how much of a correlation
between pairs of variables can be explained by other variables, was rather high (.906).
The value of the Bartlett test of sphericity, which represents fitness of factor analysis, was
5,759.721, with a significance probability of p = .000. This suggests that the use of factor
analysis was adequate to identify accountability items of collaborative governance. Next,
this study conducted reliability analysis for factors that considered each item of the sur-
vey. In terms of Cronbach’s α value, factor 1 (.813), factor 2 (.729), and factor 3 (.740)
showed values higher than 0.7, while factor 4 (.688) and factor 5 (.643) showed values
over 0.6. This indicates that the identified factors have high reliability (table 7).
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Table 7. Exploratory Factor Analysis
Survey item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
a10 .680 .163 .121 .160 .008
a09 .665 .141 .209 .011 .220
a07 .651 .155 .286 .043 -.045
a06 .600 .078 .099 .229 -.052
a04 .561 .166 .057 .406 -.208
a05 .558 .164 .065 .217 .094
a08 .526 -.012 .443 .059 -.239
a19 .514 .400 .271 .137 -.052
a18 .121 .736 .153 .035 .055
a16 .190 .725 .077 -.006 .003
a20 .103 .610 .092 .087 .187
a17 .407 .486 .274 -.047 -.004
a14 .060 .468 .142 .208 -.440
a15 .378 .442 .322 .086 -.070
a22 .214 .143 .785 .152 -.098
a21 .160 .188 .747 .081 .016
a23 .299 .273 .598 .023 .141
a01 .163 -.009 .057 .809 -.054
a02 .249 .034 .172 .729 .066
a03 .338 .270 -.104 .387 .282
a13 -.148 -.089 -.227 -.172 .640
a11 .145 .264 .194 .234 .593
a12 .054 .289 .227 .364 .499
Eigenvalue 3.637 2.747 2.381 1.959 1.528
Variance ratio 31.432% 8.014% 7.028% 5.311% 5.043%
Accumulated variance ratio 31.432% 39.446% 46.474% 51.785% 56.828%
Cronbach’s α .813 .729 .740 .668 .643
KMO scale = .906; Bartlett test of sphericity = 5759.721 (p=.000)
Five accountability factors identified through EFA are different from the account-
ability factors for the foundation of bureaucratic management that the initial research
framework suggested (see table 1). Table 8 shows attributes of measurement items
grouped within the five factors. Factor 1 emphasizes communication with local resi-
dents in the decision-making process to improve transparency and democracy as well
as to reflect people’s complaints. Factor 2 is related to the clarity of the relevant law,
enforcement decree, and regulation. Factor 3 demonstrates representativeness and
expertise of council members. Factor 4 includes responses to local residents’ opinions
and evaluations. Factor 5 addresses the reward and incentive system, which shows the
importance of a reward from a higher authority or an inside reward for members of a
council or volunteers.
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Table 8. Regrouping Accountability Index for Collaborative Governance
Survey item Description Index
a10 • Transparency and democracy of decision-making process Factor 1
a09 • Effort to communicate with local residents in decision-making process





a18 • Direct/indirect control (sanction) power of local residents Factor 2
a16 • Clear description of council members’ tasks and work process
a20 • Obligation of council members for active participation and pursuit of public interest
a17 • Clarity of regulation and rules
a14
a15
a22 • Representativeness and expertise of community council members Factor 3
a21
a23
a01 • Evaluation and feedback on council activities by local residents and higher authority Factor 4
a02 • Performance management
a03
a11 • Scope of achieved outcome subject to official criticism or commendation for Factor 5
a12 collaborative accomplishment
• Positive/negative incentives for voluntary collaboration
• Reward and incentive system 
DISCUSSION: ASSESSING ACCOUNTABILITY 
OF COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE
The implication of these factors becomes clear when examined in light of charac-
teristics of collaborative governance.4 All five factors are either directly or indirectly
connected to the structure, process, and outcome of collaboration, which are the three
main attributes of collaborative governance (table 9).
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Table 9. Accountability Index for Collaborative Governance
Category Index Description
Accountability Clarity of law and regulation Direct/indirect control (sanction) power of local 
for structure (factor 2) residents
Clear description of tasks and work process for 
community council members
Obligation of the council members to active 
participation and pursuit of public interest
Clarity of laws and regulations
Representativeness and Representativeness of council members
expertise of community Expertise of council members
council members (factor 3)
Accountability Communication with local Transparency of decision-making process
for process residents through transparent Democracy of decision-making process
and democratic decision- Effort to communicate with local residents in decision-
making process (factor 1) making process
Accountability Performance management Evaluation and feedback for performance by local 
for outcome (factor 4) residents and higher authority
Reward and incentive system Scope of achieved joint outcome subject to official 
(factor 5) criticism or commendation for collaborative 
accomplishment
Positive/negative incentives for voluntary collaboration
4. Previous studies on collaborative governance do not provide consistent definitions of the
concept of collaboration. The concept has been developed more actively in the fields of
organizational relations (Warren et al. 1975; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Alexander 1995;
Tang and Mazmanian 2008), networks (Alter and Hage 1993; O’Toole 1997; O’Toole,
Meier, and Nicholson-Crotty 2005; Powell 1990), and group behavior (Olson 1971;
Ostrom 1990). This study defines collaboration as a collective behavior pattern that is the
opposite of noncollaboration and a process that aggregates private interests and preferences
into collective choices. Noncollaboration is defined as a process of competition by multiple
actors based on their respective interests and preferences to vie for a goal or tool.
Structure
The structure of collaborative governance is relatively amorphous compared to that
of conventional bureaucracy (Kim 2008, 51). The reason for this stems from the inherent
nature of collaborative governance, which involves decentralization of power and joint
decision making as well as the participation of multiple actors (Tang and Mazmanian
2008, 5). In order to ensure accountability for the effective operation of a governance
system, legal and systematic devices should be clear enough to dissuade conflict as
much as possible, while promoting collaboration. As supporters of neo-institutional
analysis claim, laws and regulations are social mechanisms to predetermine the behav-
iors and interactions of all the involved actors. It is also necessary to examine whether
representatives of particular interest groups have sufficient expertise and whether their
authority is acknowledged by relevant groups. Participation of multiple stakeholders
comes in the form of indirect participation in a modern social structure; without recog-
nized representativeness of agents, the foundation of collaborative governance may be
weakened. It is equally important to ensure that these representatives have solid exper-
tise in order to understand and reflect local residents’ needs and ideas.
Process
Collaborative governance is an interactive system and process based on the princi-
ple of interdependence (Kim et al. 2002; Hong 2004; Suh and Min 2005). Presumably,
the accountability of collaborative governance increases if the decision-making
process is transparent and democratic and communication is active to examine and
reflect local peoples’ needs and demands, as they are the primary consumers of goods
and services that collaborative governance produces. The fairer the process of collect-
ing opinions from multiple participants, the more collaborative the interaction
becomes to reach a shared goal.
Outcome
The main mechanism of collaborative governance is mutual collaboration to solve
shared problems and achieve shared goals (Henton et al. 2008, 3-4), and such an effort
is expected to provide prompt and more effective solutions by reducing the cost of the
decision-making process (Park 2008, 123). That is, the collaborative process and the
democratic nature of collaborative governance are not only valued for their democratic
nature but are also believed to yield more effective and efficient outcomes than the
vertical decision making of a conventional bureaucracy. In discussing the accountability
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of collaborative governance, accountability for outcome (performance) emerges as a
critical factor, which can be facilitated by designing and implementing performance
management and a proper reward and incentive system.
ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY OF COLLABORATIVE 
GOVERNANCE IN KOREAN COMMUNITY CENTERS
This study conducted an EFA for 23 items from 10 accountability indexes that
were developed from the perspective of conventional bureaucracy and compressed
them into five factors in order to maximize the variation of variables (see table 7). The
factors that are crucial for Korean community centers that have adopted collaborative
governance are (1) transparent and democratic decision-making, (2) clarity of laws
and regulations, (3) representativeness and expertise of community council members,
(4) performance management, and (5) reward and incentive system.
This study also analyzed differences that could affect perceptions of the importance
of these five factors. To this end, it divided survey respondents into two sets of groups,
one representing function and the other location—public participants (heads of
eup/myeon/dong offices and civil servants) and civil participants (heads and members
of community councils), and city and non-city community centers—and conducted
independent sample t-tests on these two groups. The results suggested that both differ-
ences should be considered when developing accountability measurement indexes.
Differences between Public and Civil Groups
The public and civil groups perceived different levels of importance in three out of
five factors: clarity of laws and regulations (factor 2), performance management (factor
4), and rewards and incentives (factor 5). Results are reviewed in more detail in table 10.
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Table 10. Differences between Public and Civil Groups in Perceptions of Factors Affecting 
the Accountability of Collaborative Governance (independent sample t-test)
Factor
Levene’s equal variance test t-test for the sameness of means
F p t p
Factor 1 0.606 .437 -1.486 .138
Factor 2 2.262 .133 -3.848 .000*
Factor 3 2.066 .151 -0.170 .865
Factor 4 0.239 .625 3.641 .000*
Factor 5 0.148 .700 0.105 .916
*p < .01
The public group rated the importance of accountability for the outcomes of collab-
oration higher than the civil group did. This may be because the outcomes of collabo-
ration are closely related to positive or negative work performance incentives for civil
servants. The civil group perceived the clarity of laws and regulations as a more
important factor than the outcomes of collaboration. Almost no institutional compen-
sation is given to the chairpersons or members of community councils in relation to
the performance of the community centers. Therefore, they can only pursue intangible
compensations, such as benefits to their political careers and reputations. The institu-
tional compensations and motives that they can pursue are the clarification of laws and
regulations, and it seems that they ultimately pursue the expansion of the authority of
community councils through those.
Differences between City and Non-city Groups
Questionnaire respondents were also divided into a city group (residing in city or
gu units) and a non-city group (residing in district or eup or myeon units), and inde-
pendent sample t-tests were conducted on each. The results indicated that differences
between the two groups existed in three out of five factors: accountability of the
process of collaboration (factor 1) and in the outcomes of collaboration (factors 4 and
5). These are described in more detail in table 11.
The city group gave more importance to accountability for the outcomes of collab-
oration (factor 4 and factor 5) than did the non-city group, while the non-city group
perceived accountability for the process of collaboration (factor 1) to be more impor-
tant than did the city group. In general, city groups have larger populations, more
diversity and larger budgets than non-city groups. In addition, exchanges between
actors depend on formal decision-making processes with high levels of institutional-
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Table 11. Differences between City and Non-city Groups in Perceptions of Factors Affecting 
the Accountability of Collaborative Governance (independent sample t-test)
Factor
Levene’s equal variance test t-test for the sameness of means
F p t p
Factor 1 0.163 .687 -4.177 .000*
Factor 2 0.007 .935 -0.141 .888
Factor 3 0.001 .976 1.384 .167
Factor 4 0.279 .598 4.252 .000*
Factor 5 7.141 .008 2.184 .029**
*p < .01, **p < .05
ization rather than on informal contacts and emotional exchanges. The city group,
therefore, can be more sensitive to outcomes than the non-city group, and it appears
that, for this reason, the city group gave more importance to the accountability of the
outcomes of collaboration than the non-city group did. On the other hand, compared to
the city group, the non-city group has a smaller regional scope and is more likely to
depend on emotional exchange structures based on informal and face-to-face contacts
rather than on formal and official exchange methods. Also, their budgets are smaller.
From this information, the non-city group can be considered as regarding the account-
ability of decision-making processes more important than the accountability of direct
performances.
This observation suggests that, as in the case of public and civil groups, which
must be distinguished to ensure the accountability of community centers, differentiat-
ed measures to ensure accountability should be prepared for city groups and non-city
groups based on differences in their perceptions. In particular, compensation and moti-
vation systems linked with performance should be established for city groups, and
measures to ensure accountability relating to decision-making processes and overall
collaboration processes are necessary for non-city groups.
This paper reviewed the factors likely to affect the accountability of the Korean
community centers which is an empirical case of collaborative governance system. It
suggested five key factors : communication with local residents through transparent
and democratic decision-making process, clarity of law and regulation, representative-
ness and expertise of community council members, performance management, reward
and incentive system. The analysis also suggested that it is necessary to conceive dif-
ferent performance management and incentive systems for public and civil groups for
a better functioning of collaborative governance arrangements.
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